We investigate the vulnerability of convolutional neural network (CNN) 
Introduction
The high accuracy of state-of-the-art face recognition (FR) methods comes from their ability to handle the inevitable variability in the input data. In recent years, convolutional neural network (CNN) based FR systems have demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to compensate for such variability, as evidenced by their near-perfect recognition performance on difficult datasets such as the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset [8] . This very ability to discount the inter-session variability, however, also makes an FR system vulnerable to presentation attacks (PA) [6, 7, 12] (also called spoofing attacks). rigid mask [7] and flexible custom silicone mask (this study).
PAs fall into two categories: impersonation, where the attacker attempts to impersonate the victim, and obfuscation, where the attacker wishes to avoid being recognized.
Mohammadi et al. [12] have shown that state-of-the-art CNN-FR systems are highly, and at times, completely vulnerable to 2D impersonation-PAs, that is, to print-attacks, and to replay-attacks performed using electronic presentation attack instruments (PAI) .
In this work we consider PAs using custom flexible masks made of silicone. At present, a large body of research exists on the subject of face presentation attack detection (PAD) [11, 15] . Most face-PAD countermeasures, however, have been developed to detect 2D PAs. Very few researchers [2, 7, 16] have considered the threat from 3D-mask based PAs (two examples of such attacks are illustrated in Fig. 1 ). The PAs considered in these studies have been created using rigid-masks [7, 16] , and generic latex masks [2] . This is the first systematic study on the vulnerability of FR systems to impersonation attacks based on custom-made silicone masks. One reason for the lack of research on this specific kind of PA is that constructing a custom-silicone mask requires a high level of expertise, and therefore, is an expensive process. The cost of manufacturing such custom silicone masks, however, is dropping, and custom-masks are expected to become fairly affordable in the near future.
In this paper we primarily address the question: "How vulnerable are CNN-FR systems to PAs using custom silicone masks?" Specifically, we investigate the vulnerability of three CNN-FR systems -VGG-Face [13] , LightCNN [23] and Facenet [17] -to mask-based PAs. The reason these specific CNN-FRs have been chosen for this study is that they were shown to have very high FR performance, as well as the highest vulnerability to 2D PAs [12] .
The main contributions of this study are as follows.
1. This is the first FR-vulnerability study involving impersonation PAs made using custom silicone masks. Our experiments clearly show that the three CNN-FR methods are all significantly vulnerable to custom-mask based PAs. 2. We also present preliminary results of PAD for such PAs, based on thermal imagery. In Section 2 we provide brief reviews of relevant works by other researchers. The three CNN-FR methods evaluated here are briefly described in Section 3. The data and protocols used in this study are described in Section 4, and experimental results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 978-1-5386-7180-1/18/$31.00 c 2018 IEEE 6 provides a summary of this study, the conclusions drawn from the results, and an outlook on future work.
Related Works
Several strands of related works are relevant to this paper. Here we provide brief overviews of relevant background. CNNs for Face Recognition Several CNN-FR methods have been proposed in the recent scientific literature. Taigman et al. [21] have proposed DeepFace, a 9-layer CNN for FR. They use 3D modeling and piecewise affine transforms to first align the input faces to an upright position, before feeding the corrected face-image to the DeepFace network. This network achieves a recognition accuracy of 97.25% on the LFW dataset. Schroff et al. [18] report an accuracy of 99.63% on the LFW dataset using FaceNet, a CNN with 7.5 million parameters, trained using a novel triplet loss function. One of the most popular CNN-FR systems today is the VGG-Face CNN [13] .
In this work we analyze the vulnerability to PAs of three CNN-FR methods: the popular VGG-Face [13] , LightCNN [23] , and FaceNet [17] . These networks are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 3D-Mask PAD Although 3D-mask based attacks are quickly evolving into significant threats, methods to detect such attacks have only recently attracted research interest.
The first publicly available experimental dataset, 3DMAD [7] , was created in 2013, using a set of rigid custom masks manufactured on a 3D-printer. Other researchers [1] have used the 3DMAD dataset for 2D face-PAD experiments. Liu et al. [9] have published the more recent HKBU-MARs dataset containing images of 3D-rigid-mask based PAs. They have successfully used remote photo-plethysmography (rPPG) to detect 3D-mask PAs. Both works ( [7, 9] ) have demonstrated the vulnerability of FR methods to the PAs using rigid masks.
Previous works involving flexible masks, in particular [2, 10] , have proposed PAD methods for obfuscation PAs, based on generic silicone and latex masks, not impersonation attacks using custom-made masks. The observational study by Manjani et al. [10] is based on images collected from the Internet (the SMAD dataset), that is, the data used in the study was not collected under controlled conditions. Hence, we cannot rule out the influence of factors beyond the control of the authors over their PAD results. The work of Agarwal et al. [2] (based on the MLFP dataset) also addresses obfuscation attacks based on generic latex masks. Unlike impersonation-attacks (studied in the present work) obfuscation attacks, by their very nature, do not involve custommade masks. Extended-Range Imagery for PAD Raghavendra et al. [14] have published a detailed study on the vulnerability of FR systems in multispectral imaging domain, involving seven-band imagery covering the visible light and NIR illumination. Steiner et al. [19] have recently demonstrated the use of multispectral SWIR imagery to reliably distinguish human skin from other materials, and have shown that such multispectral devices can be used for PAD. Both these works have used custom-built imaging systems.
Bhattacharjee and Marcel [5] have used a new crop of offthe-shelf extended-range imaging devices to detect 2D as well as mask-based PAs.
The Studied CNN-FR Methods
A typical FR system functions in three phases: training, enrollment, and probe. In the training phase a background model, assumed to broadly represent a sub-space of faceimages, is constructed using training data. In the enrollment phase, the FR system uses the background model to generate templates for the given enrollment samples, which are then stored in the gallery. In the probe phase, the FR system is presented with a probe-image and a claimed identity. The template created for the probe-image is compared with the set of enrolled templates for the claimed identity. The match-score is thresholded to reach a decision (accept/reject).
Sub-images representing individual faces are first extracted from the raw input image. Geometric and color transforms may also be applied to the extracted face-images, depending on the requirements of the specific FR method. The result of this pre-processing stage is a normalized face image, of predefined size and scale, that may form an input to a FR system. Before describing the different CNN-FR methods, we explain the pre-processing steps applied to normalize the input face images.
Face Image Normalization
For the FaceNet and VGG-Face networks, the input images are normalized color (RGB) images, whereas the LightCNN expects normalized gray-level face-images of fixed 2D-shape. Our first pre-processing step is to convert the input RGB image to a gray-level image. The face region in the input image is localized as follows. First, a face-detector [4] is used to localize the face-region. Next, facial-landmarks are extracted from the face-region using the flandmarks method [22] . This method returns pixel coordinates for seven facial landmarks, including the two corners of each eye, from which we estimate the locations of the two eye-centres. Imposing the constraints that the straight-line joining the two eye-centres should be horizontal, and should have a predefined length, an affine transform is used to extract a normalized face-image of fixed size from the given input image.
The three CNN-FR methods are discussed in the following sub-sections. Note that, for all three CNNs, we have used the same parameter-settings as used in [12] .
CNN-Based Systems
For FR applications, CNNs are usually trained for face identification, using face-images as input, and the set of identities to be recognized as output. For face-verification applications, CNNs are typically used as feature-extractors. The terms representation and embedding are used interchangeably, to denote the outputs of the various layers of a deep network. Representations generated by a specific layer of a pre-trained CNN may be used as templates (feature-vectors) representing the corresponding input images. Such templates may be subsequently be compared to each other using appropriate similarity measures. Brief descriptions of the selected CNNs are provided below.
VGG-Face CNN:
VGG-Face is a CNN consisting of 16 hidden layers [13] . The input to this network is an appropriately normalized color face-image of pre-specified dimensions. We use the representation produced by the penultimate fully-connected layer ('fc7') of the VGG-Face CNN as a template for the input image. When enrolling a client, the template produced by the VGG-Face network for each enrollment-sample is recorded. LightCNN: Even though LightCNN [23] involves a much smaller number of parameters than the VGG-Face network, it shows marginally better FR performance on the LFW dataset than VGG-Face. Here we use as templates the 256-D representation produced by the 'eltwise fc1' layer of LightCNN. FaceNet CNN: We have used the implementation of FaceNet, and associated models, published by David Sandberg [17] . This is the closest open-source implementation of the FaceNet CNN proposed by Schroff et al. [18] . Sandberg's FaceNet implements an Inception-ResNet V1 DNN architecture [20] . In our tests, we have used the 20170512-110547 model from Sandberg. We use the 128-D representation at the output of the 'embeddings:0' layer of FaceNet to construct enrollment and probe templates.
During verification, the CNN generates a template for the probe face-image, which is then compared to the enrollment templates of the claimed identity using the Cosine-similarity measure. The score assigned to the probe is the average Cosine-similarity of the probe-template to all the enrollmenttemplates of the claimed identity. If this score exceeds a preset threshold, the probe is accepted as a match for the claimed identity.
Description of Masks and Dataset
The masks used in this study are described in this section. We also explain here our data-collection process.
Custom-made Silicone Masks
Of the 14 participants in this study (denoted as subjects A -N hereafter), custom silicone masks have been manufactured for six subjects, A -F. These masks have been manufactured by a professional special-effects company, at a cost of approximately USD 4,000 per mask. For each of the six subjects, the manufacturer was provided with the following data: (1) 3D-scan of the face, collected using an Intel Realsense SR300 camera, (2) color photographs of subject's face (frontal, lateral and diagonal views), and, (3) physical measurements of facial features. For each subject, the manufacturer first made a cast of the subject's face and used that to create the silicone mask. Superficial features of each mask, such as eye-brows and facial make-up, were finished manually. The manufacturer has also provided a bespoke matching support for each mask.
Silicone mask examples are shown in Figure 3 . The inner surface of each mask is coated with an adhesive substance, which helps to hold the mask in position when worn. The masks are manufactured with holes in eye-locations. In Figure 3 the masks are shown mounted on their bespoke supports provided by the manufacturer, with glass eyes and silicone eye-sockets, also provided by the manufacturer.
Data Collection
Two cameras -the Realsense SR300 from Intel, and the Compact Pro from Seek-Thermal -have been used for recording bona fide and attack presentations in this work. SR300: this camera, priced at about USD 150, captures three kinds of data: color (RGB) images, near-infrared (NIR, 860nm) images, and depth-data. We have captured color images at full-HD resolution, and the corresponding NIR and depth images at VGA resolution, at 30 frames per sec. (fps). Compact Pro: this camera, costing about USD 500, collects thermal (long-wave infra-red (LWIR)) images at QVGA resolution, at approximately 10 fps. In our experiments the two cameras have been used in a fixed spatial configuration, such that it is straightforward to extract face-regions in the thermal image (from Compact Pro), based on computations on the color image (from SR300). Samples images in the different wavelengths are shown in Figure 4 . Images in the top row of the figure correspond to bona fide presentations and images in the bottom row correspond to mask-PAs. Note that the mask is clearly distinguishable in the thermal image.
Dataset and Experimental Protocols
The dataset collected for this study is named the CS-MAD (Custom Silicone Mask Attack Dataset) 1 . The dataset consists of videos as well as still photographs.
As mentioned before, masks for subjects A -F have been used in this work. Bona fide presentations have been captured for each of the six subjects, as well as for remaining eight (G -N) subjects. Videos of bona fide presentations have been recorded under four different illumination conditions, namely: (1) i1: ceiling lights, (2) i2: floor-standing incandescent lamp illuminating the subject from the left side only, (3) i3: similar floor-standing illumination from the right side only, and (4) i4: floor-standing illumination from both sides of the subject. Thus, four short (5 -10 sec.) bona fide presentation-videos have been recorded for each subject. For certain subjects, four additional bona fide videos have been recorded (corresponding to the four illumination conditions described above), where the subjects are wearing spectacles. The spectacles as well as the different illumination conditions introduce substantial variability in the dataset.
High quality still color photographs have also been captured using a Nikon Coolpix P520 camera, for subjects A -F. Several photographs, from varying angles, have been collected for each subject. These photographs were initially collected to aid the mask-manufacturer but have also been used in the vulnerability analysis experiments.
Mask PA videos using both cameras have also been captured under the same four illumination conditions. Two kinds of PA videos have been recorded: (1) where each mask is worn by a person, and (2) where the masks are mounted on their corresponding supports provided by the manufacturer. In the first case, the masks have each been worn by two subjects, in turn. In total, the dataset used in this work consists of 88 bona fide videos, 160 mask-PA videos, and 60 highquality still color bona fide photographs. The vulnerability of each CNN-FR system has been assessed for the six identities A -F. The face-verification protocol for the vulnerability analysis is as follows: Enrollment: one frontal photograph and 3 videos (illuminations i1, i2, and i3), for subjects A -F. Probe: one bona fide video (illumination i4) and all the remaining still images for subjects A -F, all bona fide videos for subjects G -N, as well as all mask-attack videos. No training set is necessary in these experiments, as we have used pre-trained CNNs provided by the creators of the respective networks. Given the small size of the CS-MAD (custom-masks for only 6 identities), we have used the entire dataset as test data. The vulnerability analysis results presented in Section 5 are based on a posteriori selection of classification thresholds.
Experiments
Vulnerability analysis results for the three CNN-FR methods, followed by PAD results are summarized in this section.
Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability of each CNN-FR method to custom silicone masks is estimated as follows: identities are enrolled in the FR system using bona fide enrollment samples and a gallery is created for each identity. During evaluation, the gallery-templates are compared against genuine samples (bona fide samples compared against gallery templates of the true identities respectively) as well as ZEI samples (bona fide samples compared against the gallery of another identity). Based on the comparison scores obtained so far, the operating score-threshold is chosen so as to minimize the misclassification rate between genuine and ZEI presentations. The probe-template of each mask-PA sample
